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cases, thus preserving the vigor of the test for post-nuptial
cases. Either would have been preferable to the decision
in this case which weakens a desirable presumption to avoid
a holding upon a widely discredited rule. Eighteen years
have passed since the Lord Mansfield Rule was first attacked in this REVEw,47 and though the court has referred
to the Rule in derogatory terms,4 s its pernicious effect has
been avoided, as in this case, by decreasing the quantum of
proof necessary to set it aside, a result which is not desirable. Perhaps this case indicates that the Rule is too deeply
embedded in the law of this state to be readily overruled"
and that remedial legislation" is necessary.
RICHARU

R.

BuRGEE

State Labor Board Prevention Of Violent Union
Conduct, Even Though An Unfair Labor
Practice Under NLRA
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board and Kohler Co.'
Appellant union and appellee, Kohler Co., failed to reach
an accord concerning a collective bargaining agreement.
The company's production workers struck and picketed
the company premises. Ten days later the company filed a
complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
charging the appellant union and others with unfair labor
practices under the state labor act.2 The complaint alleged
"7Note, 3 Md. L. Rev. 79 (1938). The author, after discussing the Lord
Mansfield Rule, made a strong bid to the courts of this state to limit or
abolish it.
"The Court of Appeals in the Clark case, supra, n. 39, referring to the
rule, at page 368 said: "In 1777, Lord Mansfield was inspired - apparently
by some brooding omnipresence in the sky - to declare that 'decency,
morality and policy' required the law to be (such). . . ." Parenthetical
material supplied. Again, at page 369: "The Poulett Peerage case cited no
authority for its conclusion - it merely announced in certainties as Jovian
as those of Lord Mansfield that the law was so."
EVIDENCP (3rd ed. 1940) 367, Sec. 2063: "It may have be"7 WxoU0Ro,
come, in some jurisdictions, too deeply planted to be uprooted." Cited in
Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 354, 196 A. 318 (1938).
8DLegislation is recommended on the order of 9 U. L. A. Sec. 16, as set
forth, supra, n. 10. For a caustic criticism of the Lord Mansfield Rule see
WO[roon, op. cit., ibid, Secs. 2063, 2064.
176 S. Ct. 794 (1956).
2WiSC. STAT. (1953), Sec. 111 et seq.
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that members of appellant union engaged in mass picketing,
thereby obstructing entrance to and egress from the Kohler
plant; interfered with the free and uninterrupted use of
public ways; prevented persons desiring to be employed
by Kohler from entering the plant; and coerced employees
who desired to work, and threatened them and their families with physical injury. Finding the allegations true, the
State Board ordered appellant union and certain of its
members to cease such activities. The order was enforced
without substantial change by a Wisconsin Circuit Court,
whose decision was affirmed by the State Supreme Court.3
On appeal, the question is presented whether or not a State
may enjoin through its labor board acting under its labor
statute violent union conduct such as here which may also
be an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended." The Supreme Court, through Mr.
Justice Reed, held the State could so enjoin. Mr. Justice
Douglas, with the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black concurring, dissented.
Although finding that the alleged conduct was a violation of Section 8(b) (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act,5 so that the National Board might have issued an order
similar to that of the State Board, it seemed obvious to the
majority of the Court that the Laburnam case' made it clear
that Section 8(b) (1) was not to be the exclusive method
of controlling violence. As further support for the nonexclusive nature of the Federal remedy, the majority referred to Senator Taft's admission of concurrence of State
and Federal remedies,7 which could not have referred solely
8269 Wis. 578, 70 N. W. 2d 191 (1955).
'29 U. S. C. A. (1956), Sec. 158(b)1.
8
Ibid.

"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or

its agents (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 .. "
0 United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656, 666-669 (1954).
'Supra, n. 1, 798, quoting: 93 Cong. Rec. 4437 (1947) :
"The Senator from Oregon a while ago said that the enactment of
this proposed legislation will result in duplication of some of the State
laws. It will duplicate some of the State laws only to the extent, as
I see it, that actual violence is involved in the threat or in the operation.

"Mr. President, I may say further that one of the arguments has
suggested that in case this provision covered violence it duplicated
State law. I wish to point out that the provisions agreed to by the
committee covering unfair labor practices on the part of labor unions
also might duplicate to some extent that State law. Secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes, and so forth, may involve some violation

of State law respecting violence which may be criminal, and so to some
extent the measure may be duplicating the remedy existing under
State law. But that, in my opinion, Is no valid argument."
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to state criminal law "since Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111,
United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,' the leading
case dealing with violence under this same Wisconsin
statute, was well known to Congress".9 Thus, though a
State may not, in furtherance of its public policy, enjoin
conduct "which has been made an 'unfair labor practice'
under the federal statutes","0 the Court in the instant case
stated that its post Taft-Hartley opinions "have made it
clear that this general rule does not take from the States
power to prevent mass picketing, violence, and overt threats
of violence"." Because the State's dominant interest in
preventing violence and property damage cannot be questioned and since the States are the natural guardians of the
public against violence, the Court refused to interpret an
act of Congress as leaving the States powerless to avert the
fear and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction without compelling directions to that effect.
The dissenting Justices, favoring the Garner case's 2
"duplication-of-remedies test", saw the majority decision
as a "retreat from Garner" which will "open the door to
unseemly conflicts between state and federal agencies"."
The dissent distinguished the Allen-Bradley case as being
decided at a time when the Federal Act made no provision
for enjoining union activity. Admitting that both State and
Federal regulation of the same act may survive to the extent of permitting State criminal sanctions and non-duplicating civil sanctions, the dissenting Justices saw the state
administrative remedy here as reaching the same conduct
in the very same manner as the Federal administrative
remedy and therefore "a precise duplication of remedies
which is pregnant with potentialities of clashes and
conflicts". 4
The problem of defining the area of exclusive Federal
jurisdiction under the Labor Management Relations Act is
a difficult one since the Act "leaves much to the states,
though Congress has refrained from telling us how much".
There has been created a "penumbral area [which] can be
rendered progressively clear only by the course of litiga8315 U. S. 740, 748-749 (1942).
9

Supra, n. 1, 799.

10Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 475 (1955).

76 S. Ct. 794, 799 (1956).
"Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953).
Supra, n.11, 800.
"Ibid.
"Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra,n. 12, 488.
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tion". 1 The extent to which the "course of litigation" has
brought clarity to this area has been the subject of recent
articles and comments." The decision of the Court in
Garner v. Teamsters Union18 has been cited as "oust[ing]
' 1
the state courts of all jurisdiction over peaceful picketing 1
and deciding that state courts "were without power to
enjoin picketing by a labor union in violation of both federal
and state labor relations statutes"."
Although the Court, in the Garner case, specifically
recognized the state's "historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use
of streets and highways", 2 ' the language is sweeping with
regard to the prohibition of duplicate state and federal
remedies.22 The Laburnum case reiterated the "duplicationof-remedies" test and distinguished the Garner decision
on the basis of that test.2 3 Again, in Weber v. AnheuserBusch, Inc.,2 4 the Court discussed the pertinence of both the
Garner and Laburnum decisions in terms of duplication
of remedy.
Whether one characterizes the majority opinion as having "wiped away a portion of the doctrine of 'preemption'
and exclusiveness of the National Labor Relations Board's
jurisdiction in 'unfair labor practice' cases in which mass
picketing and violence were present",2 5 or merely as having
pointed up a distinction which was implicit in prior decisions, it seems clear that the Court, if not "abandoning
the conflict-of-remedies argument that was given so much
weight in Garner",8 is at least stating a major qualification
of that argument in instances where the state interest in
law and order is involved.2 The majority clearly refuses to
oust the States from their power to enjoin mass picketing
and violent union conduct, whether determination thereof
10Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, n. 10, 480-481. Parenthetical
material supplied.
11Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal versus State Jurisdiction, 42
A. B. A. J. 415 (1956) ; Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1297 (1954). See also notes, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 602 (1955);
54 Mich. L. Rev. 540 (1956).
Supra,n. 12.
10Note, 22 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 770, 773 (1954).
2*Note, 40 A. B. A. J. 145 (1954).
21Supra, n. 12, 488.
Ibid, 488-491.
mUnited Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656, 663-665 (1954).
348 U. S. 468, 474-477 (1955).
Note, 7 Labor Law Journal 599 (1956).
'*Review of Supreme Court's Work, 25 L. W. 3025 (1956).
07 Other cases dealing with state power to stop violence in labor relations
cases include Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 459 (1950)
Auto Workers v. Wis. Board, 336 U. S. 245, 253 (1949).
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be by state administrative board or the courts, "without
compelling directions to that effect" 2 from Congress, even
though Congress has vested in the national board and the
federal courts power to exercise the same remedy.
RICA2m

R. SIGCON

Joint Adventure Agreement Survives Incorporation
DeBoy v. Harris4
In 1948 A, B and C orally agreed to associate themselves
as joint adventurers in a business of furnishing warehouse
facilities. They formed a corporation as an instrumentality
to carry out the joint enterprise. It was agreed that each
venturer was to have a fixed proportionate interest in the
assets and to receive a fixed percentage of the profits.
Shares in the corporation were issued according to the
agreed interests of the parties: A, 28%, B, 52%, and C, 20%.
By 1952 the venture had become quite successful, and
it would appear that the net worth of the enterprise far
exceeded the par value of the shares held by the joint
adventurers. B and C removed A as an officer and director
in the corporation. By resolution of the board of directors,
they recommended an increase in the authorized capital
stock of the corporation, and as stockholders, approved the
necessary charter amendment. New shares were later
issued to B and his nominees. A's pre-emptive right to purchase a proportionate share of the new issue, however, was
not denied. A alleged that B's and C's purpose in causing
this additional issue of stock was to destroy his interest in
the enterprise since they knew that by offering such a large
number of shares A would be financially unable to purchase enough of the shares to maintain his agreed proportionate interest.
A brought suit at law for the breach of the joint adventure agreement to recover the damages he sustained by
the watering down of the interest allotted to him in the
agreement. The lower court sustained a demurrer, and
2876
S. Ct. 794, 799 - The argument (ibid, p. 796) "that a State Board
will use this power to stop force and violence in order to further state labor
policy, thus creating a conflict with the federal policy as developed by the
National Labor Relations Board" did not impress the majority as being
sufficient to oust historic state police power, absent more explicit directions
from Congress.
1207 Md. 212, 113 A. 2d 903 (1955).

